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I N T R O D U C T I O N : FEMINISM AND HISTORICAL TIME  
Feminist attitudes toward tradition are typically suspicious and subversive. Yet, as feminism itself 
has become a political tradition, significant questions have emerged for feminists to address. How 
can feminism draw productively on its own history, without passively conforming to expectations of 
the past, or elevating the past as a nostalgic ideal against which to measure and compare the 
present? Conversely, how can we usher in new ideas and approaches without simply “burying” 
feminisms of the past? And how can we speak of “feminist history” without instating or reproducing 
a singular master narrative? This book considers such questions through investigating the concept of 
“historical time,” and the ways in which feminists conceptualize and produce the temporalities of 
feminism. 
In recent years, feminists have become increasingly critical of the “great hegemonic model” of 
feminism as an ascending series of “waves” or “phases” (Sandoval 2000, 47). This model severely 
constrains the ways in which feminist histories can be mapped and understood, and fosters 
problematic historiographical orientations and habits of thought. The ordering of different 
feminisms into successive waves or phases implies that only one kind of feminism is possible at a 
time and, moreover, that older forms of theory and practice necessarily become obsolete as time 
moves on. This begets a closedminded attitude toward the past, preventing us from grasping the 
unfinished possibilities of feminisms from earlier times. Further, the hegemonic model privileges the 
trajectories of Western European and North American feminism, and implies that feminisms 
everywhere have undergone, or will eventually undergo, the same shifts and patterns. In this way, it 
perpetuates the idea that some feminisms are more “advanced” than others.  
As a means of overturning the linear wave model, various feminists have called for alternative, 
nonlinear concepts of historical time: more specifically, for concepts that are multilinear, and could 
therefore account for coexisting feminist “histories in the plural” (Friedman 1995); and that are also 
multidirectional, and could thus facilitate productive conversations between feminisms of the past 
and the present (see, e.g., Fernandes 2010; Roof 1997). However, while such multidirectional or 
multilinear concepts of historical time have been mooted, there is further work to be done 
unpacking and explaining exactly what this might mean. There have been several insightful, 
provocative investigations into time and history within feminist and queer theory over the past 
decade or so (see, e.g., Brown 2001; Freeman 2000, 2010; Grosz 2004, 2005; Halberstam 2005; 
Wiegman 2000, 2004; ). 1 Yet despite this “time and history boom,” I suggest that the specific 
concept of “historical time” remains somewhat vague and under-articulated within feminist 
historiographical discourse. Indeed, historical time is one of the most notoriously elusive concepts 
within historiography and the philosophy of history more generally speaking. When we invoke 
historical time, are we referring to “objective” or “subjective” conceptions of time? To a “time in 
which” historical events occur, or to the temporality of historical events? And what does it mean to 
say that historical time “moves in more than one direction,” or to speak of “different times at the 
same time”? Is historical time bound by the laws of physics? Is it “real” or “imagined” time? 
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In light of these kinds of questions, this book undertakes an indepth, philosophical investigation into 
historical time, to elucidate and make sense of the idea that historical time is multilinear and 
multidirectional. In the first instance, I argue that historical time needs to be understood as a form of 
lived time. This gives us a solid basis for claiming that historical time “moves in more than one 
direction,” because what accounts of lived time consistently demonstrate—whether they are 
phenomenologically, hermeneutically, or sociologically oriented—is that our various ways of living 
time do not conform to a straightforward past–present–future chronology. Perception and 
experience are constituted through a complex blend of retention and anticipation, memory and 
expectation. Hence, there is a dynamic interplay and interrelation between past, present, and future 
as modes of temporal orientation. Further, I argue that historical time should be understood as 
polytemporal.2 It is an internally complex, “composite” time, generated through the interweaving of 
different temporal layers and strands. As such, there is no “one” historical time or temporal 
structure within which diverse histories are all embroiled. On the contrary, there will always be 
multiple, shifting patterns of historical time, as different histories have their own mixes of time and 
their own temporalities. 
This basic understanding of historical time as lived and polytemporal will be sketched out in a 
preliminary fashion in chapter 1 . Then, to move toward a more nuanced and fine-grained account, 
the rest of the book is organized around four kinds of time that play a vital role in determining 
configurations of historical time: the time of the trace, narrative time, calendar time, and 
generational time. 3 Chapter 2 will investigate the time of the trace, characterized by a “two-way” 
temporality, as past events spill forward into the present in the form of traces, and conversely, 
through tracing the past we are oriented “back in time.” Chapter 3 takes on narrative time, which 
generates temporal orders through marking beginnings, middles, and ends; flashbacks and flash-
forwards; turning points and returns. Chapter 4 conducts an analysis of calendar time, which dates 
and organizes history through temporal markers such as years, decades, and centuries. And finally, 
chapter 5 explores generational time: a relational time that enables the transmission and 
negotiation of cultural and political heritages. 
Over the course of the book, I draw on a variety of theorists including Dipesh Chakrabarty, Johannes 
Fabian, Paul Ricoeur, Reinhardt Koselleck, Walter Mignolo, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Luce 
Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Hortense Spillers. It is an eclectic range, but if historical time is 
multilayered and multifaceted, then it requires a theoretical approach that is itself multilayered and 
interdisciplinary (Couzens-Hoy 2009, 185–6; Ricoeur 1984, 21). Moreover, what these theorists 
share in common is a desire to articulate and engage with lived temporalities and the politics of 
time. Thus, from their different phenomenological, hermeneutical, or sociopolitical perspectives, 
each brings valuable insights to feminist historiography, as we seek to develop nonlinear concepts of 
historical time, and explore its different dimensions as a traced time, a narrated time, a dated time, 
and a relational time. 4 
Before beginning this reconstructive project, however, it is important to outline in more detail 
exactly why feminism needs alternative concepts of historical time in the first place. As such, I will 
use the rest of the Introduction to clarify my terms, my philosophical approach to feminist 
historiography, and the problematic of historical time that I am seeking to address.  
PHILOSOPHICAL FEMINIST HISTORIOGRAPHY  
The term “historiography” has two key meanings. In the first instance, it refers to a self-reflexive 
mode of historical practice: “a critical consciousness at work in the writing of history” (Chandler 
1999, 77). In the second instance, it refers to a theoretical or philosophical exercise that takes a step 
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back from the actual writing or producing of history to critically examine the “deeper” conceptual 
models that underpin historical practice. In this book, I refer to “historiography” primarily in the 
second sense, and use the term “feminist historiography” to mean a theoretical meta-reflection on 
the ways that feminists conceive and construct histories of feminism, and the resulting impacts upon 
feminist political and intellectual practice. As such, while it does take a philosophical “step back” 
from substantive history, this kind of approach does not take a disinterested view of the dynamics of 
feminist history-making. Rather, it is a strategic, engaged historiography, intimately linked to political 
concerns (La Capra 1985). 
“Feminism,” it should be acknowledged, is itself a contentious term, particularly when associated 
with the universalizing presumptions of certain strands of white “western feminism.” 5 
Consequently, various alternative terms such as “womanism,” “third world feminism,” “US third 
world feminism,” “black feminism,” or “Mestiza feminism” are frequently used, which emphasize 
geographical, cultural, and historical specificity, and mark a feminist consciousness and practice that 
is attentive to differences between women as well as to shared circumstances and potential 
commonalities. 6 While registering its potentially problematic connotations, however, this book 
retains the term “feminism” as a “placeholder.” I use it in its broadest sense to denote the plethora 
of groups and individuals engaged in challenging the subordination and oppression of women within 
male-dominated societies, and the marginalization and distortion of women’s knowledges and 
experiences within androcentric discourses. This means adopting a problem-centered understanding 
of “feminism,” as opposed to understanding it as a coherent political identity or unified theoretical 
framework. That is, I use the feminist “we,” not in presumption of a shared perspective, approach, 
or experience, but rather in presumption of a shared interest in a certain set of problems ( Elam and 
Wiegman 1995; Marder 1992). 7  
In the simple sense that feminism means challenging patriarchal domination and androcentric 
norms, the field of “feminist history” (which I use throughout as a form of shorthand for “feminist 
histories of feminism”) necessarily overlaps the field of “women’s history” (i.e., “feminist histories of 
women’s lives”). Certainly the historical project of recovering female pasts and making women 
visible in history is a vital feminist practice (Bennett 2006; Lerner 1979). Yet, the distinct idea of 
“feminist history” has emerged in conjunction with the consolidation of the idea of “feminism” itself, 
as a self-consciously articulated, organized intellectual and political movement, or coalition of 
movements. 8 As Susan Stanford Friedman explains, “the feminist desire to ‘make history’ entangles 
the desire to effect change with the desire to be the historian of change.” This means that “writing 
the history of feminism functions as an act in the present that can (depending on its influence) 
contribute to the shape of feminism’s future” (Friedman 1995, 13). In other words, feminist 
narrations of the history of feminism have themselves become part of the history of feminism (Scott 
1996, 18). My interest is thus in how feminists have sought to position themselves within histories 
and legacies of feminism, thereby self-consciously and strategically building an intellectual and 
political tradition, and a historiographical community. 
Focusing on the “internal” dynamics of feminist history—that is, on how feminists conceptualize, 
construct, and mobilize feminist histories—does admittedly risk a kind of feminist insularity. After 
all, one of the biggest problems facing feminists in contemporary contexts is how feminism is 
represented by the “outside,” for example, by discourses declaring the “end of feminism,” or 
referring to “postfeminism” as a way of marking feminism’s decline or obsolescence (Henry 2004, 
19). Another serious problem is the appropriation and redeployment of feminist concepts, for 
instance, by advertising companies advising on what is “empowering” for women, or by 
governments justifying military invasion in the name of “feminism” (Butler 2004; Power 2009). 9 
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Theories and narratives that are too internal to feminism, as Nancy Fraser points out, can “fail to 
situate interior changes in relation to broader historical developments and the larger political 
context” (Fraser 2008, 101). Moreover, separating feminism off as its own field can signify a failure 
to appreciate the various pathways into and out of feminism, and the ways in which feminisms have 
arisen in tandem with antislavery, antiracist, and anticolonial struggles, or with nationalist and 
modernization movements (Heng 1997; Roth 2004).  
By treating the “internal” temporal dynamics of feminism as a distinct topic, however, I am not 
thereby arguing for the autonomy of feminism per se. Engaging with wider political and 
socioeconomic contexts, and with antifeminist discourses, are undeniably crucial feminist tasks. Yet, 
as Diane Elam insists, “while the backlash against feminism must be taken seriously . . . merely 
instituting protective measures against threatening patriarchal intruders would be too simple a 
solution to the problem. Rather . . . it is important to ask some serious questions about what is 
happening within feminism” (Elam 1997, 55; see also Siegel 1997). On the one hand there is a 
pressing urgency to reclaim histories of feminism in response to the persistent erasure and 
misrepresentation of feminism, but this project must not be a simple resuscitation of the same old 
stories and historical models. This is because, in Friedman’s words, “our actions as feminists—
including the productions of our own history—run the risk of repeating the same patterns of thought 
and action that excluded, distorted, muted or erased women from the master narratives of history in 
the first place” (Friedman 1995, 12). As such, we need to reflexively examine the ways in which we 
are constructing and representing feminist histories to ensure that the kinds of stories we are telling 
and models we are using are not contrary to our aims. 
Such reflexive investigations have begun to appear fairly regularly within feminist theory in the past 
few years, identifying the various guises of feminism’s “great hegemonic model,” and how it is 
secured through various representational and rhetorical techniques (see, e.g., Bailey 1997; Gillis et 
al. 2004; Hemmings 2005, 2011; Hewitt 2010; Sandoval 2000). 10 Yet, as well as scrutinizing our 
writing habits and “political grammar” (Hemmings 2011), we must also interrogate our philosophical 
presumptions about historical reality and historical time. If we continue to believe, for example, that 
historical time is “ really” unidirectional, or that there is ultimately “one” historical time that we are 
all “in,” the thoroughgoing reconceptualization of historical time that feminist historiography 
requires cannot be achieved. Thus, it is not simply a question of being reflexive about how we write 
histories, but also about our philosophical presumptions concerning history and historical time more 
generally. To this end, it is illuminating to situate the problems ailing feminist historiography within 
the broader context of the philosophy of history, and to consider how feminist theory has both 
challenged, and been shaped by, prevailing philosophical paradigms. The focus in the following 
discussion will be on the legacy of the speculative philosophies of “world history” that emerged in 
Europe during the “age of Enlightenment” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
THE LEGACY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF “WORLD HISTORY”  
It must first be emphasized that there is no singular or uniform “Enlightenment” philosophy of 
history. 11 There are philosophers of the era such as Hamaan or Herder who repudiated not only the 
idea of human progress, but further the idea that one can understand human histories in unified 
terms at all (Hamaan 1996a; 1996b; Herder 1969). 12 Moreover, those philosophers such as Kant 
and Hegel who do develop a speculative philosophy of “world history” or “universal history” differ 
significantly in terms of the principles or ends that they postulate, and moreover, their general 
philosophical systems which inform their philosophies of history 13 (Hutchings 2008, 39–46). 
Nevertheless, while it has been formulated in a variety of ways, the basic speculative thesis that 
history has reason, purpose, and direction, and can be treated in the collective singular as “world” or 
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“universal history,” is a recurring and central feature of Enlightenment philosophies during this era 
(Brown 2001; Gray 2007; Koselleck 2004; Nisbet 1980). 14 Indeed, several feminist theorists have 
argued that the concept of historical time brought forth by Enlightenment philosophy is 
irredeemably bound to notions of teleological progress. In Julia Kristeva’s renowned essay “Women’s 
Time,” for example, she describes “the time of history” as the time of “project, teleology, linear and 
prospective unfolding” (Kristeva 1986c, 192). 
Of all the speculative philosophies of history, Hegel’s has arguably been the most influential. It is 
outlined most explicitly in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1975), which are worth 
briefly summarizing here for the exposition that Hegel provides of his core ideas of “graduated 
progression” and historical “totality.” 15 In the Lectures, Hegel claims that the immanent purpose or 
goal of history is for human beings to become conscious of themselves as freely and historically self-
determining beings. “World history,” he writes, represents “the development of the spirit’s 
consciousness of its own freedom and of the consequent realization of this freedom” (Hegel 1975, 
138). 16 Freedom, or self-determination, is the telos within Hegel’s philosophy of history and also 
the principle or “mechanism,” as the emergence of such self-consciousness is what drives history 
forward (Houlgate 2005, 21–2). Freedom, in Hegelian terms, is not an ahistorical phenomenon 
grounded in the will of individuals but rather one that is only meaningful within institutionalized 
relations of mutual recognition (Hutchings 2008, 44). The realization of freedom, in Hegel’s account, 
is thus not simply about individual enlightenment. He proposes that the ultimate end of “world 
history” is that “spirit” should “actualize” or “objectivize this knowledge and transform it into a real 
world, and give itself an objective existence” (Hegel 1975, 64). As such, the rise of the modern state 
is vital to Hegel’s account of “world history” where the state emerges as the self-conscious 
imposition of constraints by a community of autonomous individuals. It is an explicit realization of 
history’s implicit principle and telos:  
The state is the more specific object of world history in general, in which freedom attains its 
objectivity and enjoys the fruits of this objectivity. For the law is the objectivity of the spirit, 
and the will in its true expression; and only that will which obeys the law is free: for it obeys 
itself and is self-sufficient and therefore free. When the state or fatherland constitutes a 
community of existence, and when the subjective will of men subordinates itself to laws, the 
opposition between freedom and necessity disappears. (ibid., 97) 
According to Hegel, all societies are working out this underlying logic of realizing freedom through 
the institutionalization of the state. “World history,” he writes, unfolds in a variety of “determinate 
forms”—different “nations,” “civilizations,” or “worlds”—which can be interpreted in terms of 
different levels of self-conscious recognition of the meaning of social life as self-determination (ibid., 
51–4). Hegel speaks of four “worlds” in his Lectures: “Oriental”, “Greek”, “Roman” and “Germanic”. 
17 Though tenuously linked to specific geographical areas and historical eras, they are better 
described as “world-outlooks” that stand in a formal relation to one another (Rauch 1988, ix). Thus, 
Hegel writes that while there may be a coexistence of different “determinate forms,” each 
represents a “particular stage of development, so that they correspond to epochs in the history of 
the world” (Hegel 1975, 64). This makes it possible for Hegel to delineate a temporal hierarchy in 
which particular nations or geographical regions become identified with particular stages of 
historical development. At any given time, there will be a culture or civilization that is most 
“advanced”: 
The aim of the world spirit in world history is to realize its essence and to obtain the 
prerogative of freedom . . . but it accomplishes this in gradual stages rather than at a single 
step . . . Each new individual national spirit represents a new stage in the conquering march 
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of the world spirit as it wins its way to consciousness and freedom . . . the world spirit 
progresses from lower determinations to higher determinations and concepts of its own 
nature, to more fully developed expressions of its Idea. (ibid., 63)  
For Hegel, “world history” must therefore be treated as a unity, even though different societies and 
cultures do not work out and “actualize” the underlying logic of self-conscious self-determination at 
the same time or at the same rate. While a merely empirical study might suggest there is simply a 
plurality of human societies, cultures, and histories, for Hegel, the “philosophical” perspective 
enables us to subsume this plurality under a higher principle of unity or totality. 18 “The principles of 
the national spirits in their necessary progression,” he writes, “are themselves only moments of the 
one universal spirit, which ascends through them in the course of history to its consummation in an 
all-embracing totality” (ibid., 65). Moreover, though empirical studies may indicate that historical 
events arise and relate to one another in an arbitrary and haphazard way, the “philosophical” 
perspective reveals a rationally determinable pattern, principle, and purpose within history. This 
perspective, Hegel argues, permits us to see beyond not only the apparent arbitrariness of historical 
happenings, but also beyond historical injustices and atrocities, via the process of “intellectual 
reconciliation.” The “only thought which philosophy brings with it,” he claims, “is the simple idea of 
reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational 
process” (ibid., 27). Accordingly, philosophy “transfigures reality with all its apparent injustices and 
reconciles it with the rational” (ibid., 67). 
Within contemporary historiography, it is very rare to find an advocate of the speculative approach. 
19 In the first instance, any philosophical account that postulates an overall historical “direction” is 
easily discredited when faced with historical actualities. Hegel’s claim that reason and freedom are 
gradually becoming “realized” in social life and institutions, for example, is difficult to defend in light 
of empirical evidence to the contrary. Moreover, Hegel’s insistence that “reason governs the world” 
is extremely problematic in light of the injustices and atrocities that have continued to occur 
throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries (Adorno 1973, 306; Arendt 2006, 
86–8; Ricoeur 1988, 205). 20 Speculative philosophies of history such as Hegel’s, or at least the 
version he presents in the Lectures, have therefore been largely abandoned: first, on epistemological 
grounds, as we admit the impossibility of grasping human history as a whole and determining an 
overall pattern; and second, on ethicopolitical grounds, as we oppose reconciliatory attempts to 
rationalize historical injustices and atrocities.  
This second point relates strongly to postcolonial theories that link speculative Enlightenment 
philosophies of history with colonial logics and practices. 21 The rationalization of colonialism in 
terms of bringing “civilization” to peoples who are “behind” is clearly connected with the idea of a 
unified teleology, which makes it possible to devise a temporal hierarchy for coexisting geographical 
regions. Indeed, while this logic is arguably made most explicit within European Enlightenment 
philosophies of history like Hegel’s, Latin American theorists, such as Enrique Dussel, have traced the 
emergence of colonial temporalities back to the late fifteenth century, over three centuries before 
Hegel presented his Lectures at the University of Berlin. The Eurocentric perspective on modernity, 
Dussel argues, presumes that modern forms of subjectivity and historical consciousness originated 
exclusively in Europe, and pays singular attention to the so-called Italian Renaissance, Protestant 
Reformation, German Enlightenment, and French Revolution (Dussel 1995, 10). 22 But in Dussel’s 
account, the “birthdate” for modernity was in fact 1492: Europe’s “discovery” of America and 
“confrontation with the Other” (ibid., 12). When this earlier period becomes our focus, he argues, 
we see that modernity has arisen out of conquest and colonization, when Europe began to “organize 
the world system” and install itself as the “managerial” center and “reflexive consciousness of world 
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history.” As a result, non-European cultures that have been equally constitutive of modernity 
became relegated to the “periphery” or “underside,” or in temporal terms, to the permanently 
“behind” (ibid., 9–11; see also Dussel 1996, 2011; Alcoff and Mendieta 2000). 23 Dussel, therefore, 
not only challenges the idea that modernity is an endogenously European phenomenon; he also 
demonstrates the firm alliance between colonial domination and the speculative attempt to devise a 
“world history” under the sign of “progress.” 
Feminist theorists have also been instrumental in challenging ideas of teleological progress and 
“world history.” With the exception of those, such as Shulamith Firestone, who offer “grand 
narratives” of the history of patriarchy, 24 feminists have frequently argued that diverse histories 
cannot be subsumed under universalizing categories and temporal schemas. The approach of 
“gendering” history, for example, is premised upon the principle that differently positioned subjects 
experience and make sense of historical shifts and events in different ways (see, e.g., Kelly 1984; 
Lerner 1979; Newton 1989; Scott 1986). From this perspective, “individual groups have their own 
distinct histories, rhythms and temporalities quite apart from traditional forms of periodization” 
(Felski 2000, 3). Nonetheless, when it comes to narrating histories of feminism itself, feminists have 
often imported those very historical models and temporal logics that they have so vehemently 
criticized. 25 The “great hegemonic model” of feminism as a series of successive “phases” or 
“waves” maps out a “graduated progression” of feminist thought, and presents an integrated 
account of “feminist history” as a whole. In this sense, the legacy of speculative philosophies of 
history is more entrenched within feminist theory than may be immediately apparent. 
THE HEGEMONIC MODEL OF FEMINIST HISTORY  
The idea of different “phases” of feminism is perhaps most famously articulated by Kristeva in 
“Women’s Time,” first published in French in 1979, and in English in 1981. 26 In this essay, Kristeva 
outlines three key historical phases through which feminism has passed, each characterized by a 
distinct attitude toward time and history and a distinct way of positioning itself within space. 27 The 
first phase or “attitude,” she writes, embraced an “egalitarian” ethos, and a commitment to a 
progressive concept of historical time. Included in this phase are not only feminists of a liberal 
persuasion but also Marxist/ socialist feminists. In contrast, Kristeva proposes, the second phase of 
feminism has been guided by “Freudianism” and relinquished the earlier generation’s aspiration to 
progressive incorporation into the social contract. This more radical generation, she writes, has 
engaged in an “almost total refusal” of linear temporality, and an “exacerbated distrust of the entire 
political dimension” (Kristeva 1986c, 194). Accordingly, in Kristeva’s depiction, the feminist struggle 
in its second phase becomes a separatist struggle with difference and specificity: 
By demanding recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex . . . 
this feminism situates itself outside the linear time of identities which communicate through 
projection and revindication. Such a feminism rejoins, on the one hand, the archaic 
(mythical) memory and, on the other, the cyclical or monumental temporality of marginal 
movements. (ibid.) 
Kristeva views the second phase as an improvement on the first phase, due to its more 
thoroughgoing investigation into the relationship of the subject to power, language, and meaning 
(ibid., 196–8). However, while feminism has “at least had the merit of showing what is . . . deadly in 
the social contract,” she claims, it has in fact reverted to another means of regulating difference and 
fabricated a “scapegoat victim” (ibid., 209–10). This is the inevitable result of invoking a universal 
subject “Woman” and “mak[ing] of the second sex a countersociety” (ibid., 202). As a way out of this 
“inverted sexism,” Kristeva points to a new phase of (post)feminism 28 that is emerging in Europe. 
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She characterizes this as an “avant-garde” form of consciousness and practice, that can “break free 
of [the] belief in Woman, Her power, Her writing,” and “bring out the singularities of each woman, 
and beyond this, her multiplicities, her plural languages” (ibid., 208). 
In fact, Kristeva’s historical narrative of feminism functions in “Women’s Time” as a way of framing 
her main discussion, which concerns the possibility of transforming the symbolic order from a 
productive to a reproductive economy. Indeed, Judith Roof suggests that the gesture of locating a 
history of feminism in the essay is a “false counter” or “decoy” to her other, more “monumental 
argument” (Roof 1997, 81). Further, while presenting a highly schematic account of feminism’s 
history, Kristeva’s intention is actually to propose a more complex understanding of historical time, 
characterized by a multiplicity of temporalities (Jardine 1981). For her, it is the “third attitude” of 
avant-garde (post)feminism that holds the key to this novel understanding. She claims that the third 
attitude does not exclude the previous two attitudes, but rather makes possible “the parallel 
existence of all three ‘phases’ of feminism within the same historical time” (Kristeva 1986c, 209). In 
other words, the previous two attitudes—“insertion into history and the radical refusal of the 
subjective limitations imposed by this history’s time”—can be mixed or held together in the third 
attitude (ibid.). She also suggests an interesting way of rethinking the term “generation” in the 
essay, arguing it can imply “less a chronology and more a mental or ‘signifying space’” (ibid.). 
However, despite the promise of a new understanding of historical time, Kristeva does not develop 
these ideas in much depth or detail. Moreover, by reserving temporal complexity for the “third 
phase” alone, the essay cannot accommodate the different temporalities and positions that have 
coexisted throughout feminist pasts and presents. It therefore effectively blocks the thought of a 
more complex kind of historical time, where temporal plurality is conceived in terms of “slicing 
across time instead of being enclosed within a particular period or epoch” (Felski 2000, 3). Kristeva’s 
enticing conception of “generation” as a “signifying space” is similarly undermined by her 
presentation of the three “generations” of feminism in terms of a linear generational succession, 
even as she purports to dislodge “generations” from chronology. Consequently, while Kristeva’s 
essay opens up the problematic of time and temporality as a crucial site for feminist exploration, and 
also the possibility of a different understanding of historical time, it also ultimately repeats and 
reinforces the linear model of history that she wishes to refuse ( Osborne 1995; Roof 1997). 
Since the publication of “Women’s Time,” the idea of “phases” of feminism has become deeply 
ingrained within Western feminist theory, across its various institutional contexts and theoretical 
strands. 29 This is not only due to Kristeva’s influence, but also the influence of several classificatory 
typologies constructed by prominent feminist theorists in Europe and the United States in the 1980s, 
as Chela Sandoval demonstrates in her survey of “hegemonic feminism” (Sandoval 2000). 30 The 
typologies and narratives examined by Sandoval often differ quite markedly from one another in 
terms of their specific content, and in terms of their author’s own theoretical position. Yet, there are 
similarities in terms of general content, and also in terms of historiographical form. Thus, as 
Sandoval puts it, “manifestly different types of hegemonic feminist theory and practice are, in fact, 
unified at a deeper level into a great structure” (ibid.). 
A brief comparison between Kristeva’s account in ‘Women’s Time’ and the typology formulated by 
Alison Jaggar in Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) can demonstrate this effectively. The 
different phases of feminism that each author identifies in their respective texts do not exactly map 
on to one another. For example, Kristeva puts liberal, Marxist, and socialist feminisms together 
within one phase of “egalitarian” feminism, whereas Jaggar separates out liberalism and Marxism 
into two distinct types, and she also distinguishes between Marxist and socialist feminism, 
presenting socialist feminism as a synthesis of radical feminism and Marxism (Jaggar 1983, 123). 
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Thus, Kristeva identifies three phases: (1) egalitarian, (2) radical, and (3) avant-garde, while Jaggar’s 
account identifies four: (1) liberal, (2) Marxist, (3) radical, and (4) socialist. Moreover, the two 
authors offer different diagnoses of the feminist present and future. Kristeva, as we have seen, 
characterizes the (post)feminist present in terms of a nascent avant-garde attitude that can “bring 
out the singularities of each woman.” In contrast, Jaggar identifies the feminist present with an 
emerging form of socialist feminism that can register the significance of class and race-based 
differences, while continuing to challenge the inequitable socioeconomic structures of capitalist 
patriarchy. In this way, she hopes, it will “synthesize the best insights of radical feminism and of the 
Marxist tradition and . . . simultaneously will escape the problems associated with each” (Jaggar 
1983, 123).  
Despite the divergences between Kristeva’s and Jaggar’s respective accounts, however, both authors 
recount a similar general storyline, portraying feminist thought as a singular journey that begins with 
a universalistic egalitarianism; moves on to challenge the terms of the social contract and explore a 
specially female worldview; and finally, registers the significance of the differences between women. 
Moreover, there is a similarity of form, as both authors construct a linear narrative of progress that 
culminates in the author’s own theoretical position in the present. Kristeva depicts her preferred 
avant-garde (post)feminism as an “emerging” phase of feminism that is eclipsing the earlier forms; 
similarly, Jaggar portrays her preferred socialist feminism as a “developing” theory that has grown 
out of Marxist and radical feminisms and is moving beyond them. In both cases, the theoretical 
position to which the author aligns herself is accorded superiority through being designated as 
present or emergent, surpassing all the other phases that feminist theory has passed through to 
arrive at this moment of theoretical sophistication and promise for the future. 
Admittedly, the comparison above extracts Kristeva and Jaggar’s typologies of feminism from the 
context of their broader bodies of work, which potentially does both theorists an injustice. Kristeva 
has been highly influential in developing nonlinear understandings of temporality through her notion 
of the “subject-in-process,” and also her discussions of maternal temporality (1986b; 2002). And 
elsewhere, Jaggar has been careful to register and think through the ambiguities and tensions within 
feminist theory, for example in Living with Contradictions (1994). Nevertheless, the comparison of 
Kristeva’s and Jaggar’s respective typologies in ‘Women’s Time’ and Feminist Politics and Human 
Nature is instructive, because it shows how different feminist theorists have relied upon a common 
historiographical structure when they construct a narrative of feminist history, even when they do 
not share a common theoretical perspective. 
Clare Hemmings’ more recent research study into “feminist storytelling” in the 1990s and 2000s 
further attests to the ubiquity of this historiographical structure (Hemmings 2005; 2011). 31 She 
argues that since the late 1990s narratives of feminist history have become crystallized around 
decade-specific periodizations—the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—and more concentrated around 
questions of racial and cultural difference. In the accounts that Hemmings surveys, “1970s 
feminism” is consistently associated with universalizing and essentialist perspectives, and 
represented as largely white and middle class. The 1980s is associated with “challenges” to those 
perspectives by black and US third world feminists, and characterized as the era of “identity politics.” 
Finally, the 1990s is associated with the rise of a more “sophisticated” form of feminist theory, most 
notably post-structuralism, and an embrace of difference and diversity. Once again, we find a 
common storyline that moves from “sameness to difference,” and is organized around a series of 
phases that overcome one another in steady succession. 
Hemmings claims that this storyline is generally told from three different vantage points in the 
present. The first views the rise of post-structuralism as a positive phenomenon, and thus tells the 
10 
 
story as a “progress narrative”; the second views the rise of post-structuralism as a sign of 
feminism’s depoliticization and institutionalization, and hence tells the story as a “lament” or “loss 
narrative.” The third vantage point tells the story as a “return narrative” that uses similar markers 
and rehearses similar shifts, but adds on an “emerging” phase of “new materialism.” This is 
presented as a synthesis of the “earlier” focus on the material and the “later” focus on the cultural 
and the linguistic, within a “ new materialism” that can take us forward into the future (2011, 97). 32 
Indeed, one of Hemmings’ most interesting observations is that while protagonists of new 
materialism often propose “a nonlinear methodology that transforms the past rather than 
relinquishing or returning to it,” this proclaimed epistemological openness is often undermined by 
the schematic structure of the narratives that repeat the same phases of the hegemonic “common 
sense” narratives of feminist history, only with a new phase added on (ibid., 108; see also Ahmed 
2008). 33 As with Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time,’ a more complex understanding of historical time and 
the time of feminism is being promised; yet the narratives framing these proposals fall back on the 
progressive, singular model of history under disavowal. 
As a final illustration, feminism’s “great hegemonic model” can also be found within narratives of 
feminist “waves.” 34 The “wave” trope is the preferred term within discussions about feminism 
conducted outside the academy, particularly in the media. 35 Moreover, while the narratives of 
“phases” examined above concentrate predominantly upon intellectual shifts in feminist thought, 
narratives of feminist “waves” usually take a broader view of feminism outside, as well as inside, the 
academy. “Wave” narratives therefore tend to focus more upon specific political goals and events as 
well as theoretical developments. For example, the beginning of the “first wave” in the United States 
is conventionally marked by the Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, 1848, with 
its “ebb” being marked by the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Hewitt 2010, 3). 
The beginning of the “second wave” is similarly marked within wave narratives by significant political 
events, such as the rise of the Civil Rights movement and counter-cultural protests in the United 
States and Europe, or the passing of the Equal Rights Amendment (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 9–
10). We should also register the specific temporal implications of the trope of “waves,” which 
connotes a surge or swell of activity followed by a decline, whereas the idea of “phases” implies a 
more continuous transition from one phase to another. 
Yet, while there are features that render the “wave” trope distinct, wave narratives do tend to 
present shifts in feminist consciousness very similar in content to those presented in the phasic 
accounts of academic feminist theory cited above. The first wave is generally associated with an 
egalitarian consciousness and a reformist approach, the second wave with a consciousness of sexual 
difference and a revolutionary approach, and the “third wave” with a consciousness of diversity and 
a pluralistic approach. Further, each self-designated “wave” has tended to view themselves as “both 
building on and improving” the wave(s) that preceded them (Hewitt 2010, 2, emphasis added; see 
also Bailey 1997). Like the phasic narratives, then, wave narratives unify “feminist history” into the 
collective singular, and classify feminist thought according to a developmental taxonomy, 
representing higher and higher levels of historical, moral, political, and aesthetic development 
(Sandoval 2000, 47). 
In sum, these different variations of the hegemonic model of feminist history reinscribe two of the 
key characteristics of Hegel’s speculative philosophy of history outlined above: first, the idea of a 
“graduated progression,” and second, the idea that diverse histories can be treated as instances of a 
more general pattern or unified historical trajectory. Sandoval, Hemmings, and others, have already 
made trenchant critiques of the hegemonic model; however, in the final part of this chapter, I want 
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to clarify the major problems that result from its deployment, focusing on what I identify as its two 
core temporal logics: “teleological totalization” and “sequential negation.” 
TELEOLOGICAL TOTALIZATION  
“Teleological” is a term usually associated with speculative philosophies of history that postulate an 
inevitable progression toward ever-greater freedom and enlightenment. Such teleological 
philosophies of history are rooted in metaphysical meta-narratives that imbue the course of history 
“as a whole” with meaning or purpose: in the case of Hegel, an immanent conception of “spirit” or 
human nature as self-conscious self-determination (Dray 1964, 62–3). Yet, “teleology” can also have 
a more restricted application, denoting the retrospective designation of a particular course of events 
as a developmental trajectory, which has culminated in the present of the narrator. That is, 
teleological reasoning focuses on the end as a means of explaining and justifying the course of 
historical development (Hutchings 2008, 51). The term “totalization,” similarly, need not only be 
used in the “grand” sense of speculatively making “history as a whole” into a “complete picture” 
(Dienstag 1994). Rather, the term can also be used to refer to the practice of totalizing a designated 
“segment” of history from a standpoint in the present (Megill 1995). 36 
To claim that the hegemonic feminist narratives are “teleological” or “totalizing” thus does not mean 
they adhere to anything like Hegel’s “grand narrative” of “world history” as the inevitable realization 
of reason/freedom in history. The point, rather, is that they import teleological and totalizing logics 
into their accounts when they construct a “master narrative” and discern an overall direction within 
feminist history that has culminated in the present. In other words, the particular present of an 
author is accorded with a diagnostic privilege as they identify a singular trajectory leading from the 
past to the present moment: totalizing the past from the perspective of a knowing present and 
understanding their own approach as “last and best” (Spencer 2004, 9). 37 A major problem with the 
teleological approach is that it denies contingency, and blocks out alternative ways of thinking about 
or reading the past. It gives rise to a sense of inevitability and implacable certainty that we know 
what the past was all about, what it has meant, and what it has to teach us. This results in a 
“closedness to the past”: a resistance to letting the past surprise us and interrupt our subject 
positions and perspectives in the present. Further, the treatment of the past as a complete story 
that has led up to the present can also lead to a “closedness to the future,” as it encourages us to 
think that the identified direction will necessarily continue, and hence can prevent us from 
considering the future in terms of unpredictability, or a range of possibilities. 
The other key problem with the logic of teleological totalization is its embroilment in universalizing 
and evolutionist presumptions. That is, teleological models lend themselves to universalizing 
evolutionism because it is presumed there is an inevitable logic being worked out in local instances. 
As we have seen, Hegel’s hierarchical treatment of diverse cultures and societies as representative 
of different stages of historical development depends upon his thesis that different cultures and 
societies are all working out the same underlying logic of self-conscious self-determination (Hegel 
1975, 51–4). In the case of feminism, the legacy of this kind of teleological thinking is evident in the 
common presumption that the supposed trajectory of Western feminist theory is the trajectory of 
feminist theory, and thus, that feminisms everywhere are working out the same kinds of issues and 
problematics. The teleological aspect of feminism’s hegemonic model thereby accedes to the 
temporal structure of “First in the West, and then elsewhere” that has functioned as a cornerstone 
of colonial philosophy and policy (Chakrabarty 2000, 8). 38 
For example, the attempt to universalize historical trajectories specific to Anglo-American and 
Western European feminist movements has resulted in the presumption that feminism is something 
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that Western women “export” overseas: that the first and second waves of feminism in the West are 
“precursors” to feminist movements in other parts of the world (Spivak 1981, 160–1; Tripp 2006, 
54). Moreover, the universalization of “time-charged terminologies” such as Kristeva’s three-stage 
theory of feminist consciousness has led to assumptions and judgments that non-Western feminisms 
are “stuck,” for example, in the “liberal stage” or the “nationalist stage” (Shih 2002, 98). A clear 
example of this kind of attitude, Shumei Shih argues, is discernible in Kristeva’s text Des Chinoises or 
“About Chinese Women” (Kristeva 1986a). In this text, we find Kristeva struggling to determine the 
status of Chinese women according to “the usual temporal hierarchy of the West over China” (Shih 
2002, 98). Chinese women had greater legal equality with Chinese men than did European women 
with European men in the 1950s and after. This subverts the usual temporal hierarchy in which the 
West is more “advanced.” Yet Kristeva’s attitude toward this state of affairs is highly ambivalent. The 
advanced legal status of Chinese women, Shih writes, is “both the site of envy and anxiety . . . For 
Kristeva, Chinese women were both liberated under Mao and embodiments of the silent, primordial 
Orient” (ibid.). While Kristeva registers Chinese women’s legal equality with men, her analysis 
remains rooted in the temporal topographies of “French High Feminism” (Spivak 1981, 160–1). 
Ultimately, then, European modes of subjectivity and sociality must still be somehow “ahead.” 
SEQUENTIAL NEGATION  
The logic of teleological totalization frequently goes hand in hand with the logic of sequential 
negation when accounts of teleological progress are presented as a “graduated progression,” where 
a “series of successive determinations” are organized into an ascending order as each negates and 
overtakes the former (Hegel 1975, 138). As wehave seen, this is one of the main organizing 
mechanisms of the hegemonic model of feminist history, as feminist history is consistently divided 
into categories like “liberalism,” “Marxism,” “radical feminism,” and “poststructuralism,” which are 
mapped onto a progressive chronology, and presented as different phases or stages that oppose and 
come one after the another. 
Different feminisms do of course emerge at different times. Poststructuralist feminist theory, for 
example, informed by theorists such as Lacan, Kristeva, Derrida, or Spivak, has emerged at a later 
time than liberal feminist theory informed by thinkers such as Wollstonecraft or Mill. Yet, liberal 
feminism has not simply disappeared following the advent of post-structuralist theory; rather, it 
persists, and poses its own challenges to post-structuralist feminism in return. Indeed, feminist 
theorists often insist upon the productivity of such disagreements, debates, and arguments (Howie 
and Tauchert 2004; MacCormack 2009). The logic of sequential negation, however, seeks to contain 
and manage these disagreements through the imposition of a neat sequential order, where one 
phase comes after and displaces another. This implies that the discussion is closed, and moreover, 
that there are neatly bounded positions or types of feminist theory in the first place. While some 
feminists do indeed describe their feminism in distinctly titled terms (e.g., “Marxist,” “liberal,” or 
“post-structuralist”), other feminists have in fact often moved “between and among” different 
approaches and strategies, especially given feminism’s interdisciplinary nature (Sandoval 2000, 57). 
But this kind of methodological fluidity and coexistence cannot be grasped by the logic of sequential 
negation, with the consequence that productive explorations of the interrelations between different 
approaches and histories may be precluded. 
A related problem with the logic of sequential negation is the implication that perspectives and 
approaches derived at earlier times necessarily become redundant and “out of date.” We therefore 
confine them to the “dustbin of history” or treat them as a “historical artefact” rather than as a 
project or part of a living body of work (Weeks 2011, 117). This way of treating the past is a 
consistent feature of modern historicism, when a given text or theoretical paradigm is treated as 
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“not only of its time—developed within a particular political conjuncture and conceptual horizon—
but as only of its time” (ibid.). In other words, the gesture of “locating” a text, idea, or practice 
within a historical context often comes with a presumption that this is where it should stay, that it 
has no relevance outside of this context: “Each contribution is fixed to a linear time by a logic . . . 
that marks, seals, and divides each moment” (ibid.; see also Fleissner 2002). 39 
It is certainly necessary for feminism to be attuned to changes in social, economic, and cultural 
conditions. Indeed, the most promising aspect of self-declared third wave feminisms, I would argue, 
is the level of commitment to grappling with the “specificity of our historical situation” (Heywood 
and Drake 1997, 4). Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for instance, are particularly keen to outline 
the economic determinants of third wave feminism in the United States, emphasizing that 
“transnational capital, downsizing, privatization, and a shift to a service economy have had a drastic 
impact on the world these generations have inherited” (Heywood and Drake 2004, 13). The claim 
here is that the “new world order” necessitates an “overhaul” of feminism, as we come to recognize 
that “global capitalism is overtaking many of the social structures under which second wave 
feminists operated” (Sidler 1997, 37–8). 
Having said this, however, there is a marked tendency within third wave literature to present the 
theoretical outlook of the third wave as an inevitable by-product of its historical moment (Henry 
2004, 35). The problem with this kind of presumption is that, in actuality, there is no easy correlation 
between the context, the problem, and the type of theory that is required, as third wave narratives 
often seem to suggest. Gillian Howie describes this kind of slippage as a confusion of the “logic of 
intellectual debate with the condition of the world,” for example, when post-structuralism or 
postmodernism is mapped on to post-Fordism as the next historical stage (Howie 2010b, 5). This 
leads to presumptions that only postmodern theory is able to contend with the “messiness” of 
globalized high-capitalist conditions, when it might well be argued that postmodernism is part of the 
problem rather than the solution. Such slippages or presumptions are fuelled by the logic of 
sequential negation, which implies that only the newest forms of theory are adequate to deal with 
political challenges in the present.  
The logic of sequential negation is particularly potent when it is deployed as a form of “temporal 
othering,” 40 or as Johannes Fabian terms it, “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983, 30). This occurs 
when all those characteristics an author wishes to define their own position against—universalism, 
essentialism, racism, ethnocentrism, heterosexism, prudishness, humorlessness, authoritarianism—
are projected backwards in time, most often on to second wave or “1970s feminism.” As a 
consequence, feminist work produced during this era is frequently dismissed in a generalizing 
manner as “essentialist” or “universalizing,” without being engaged with in any detail or depth 
(Hemmings 2011; Henry 2004). An example of this can be found in Rory Dicker and Alison 
Piepmeier’s introduction to their anthology of third wave feminist essays, where they write that 
“[whilst] many of the goals of the third wave are similar to those of the second wave, some, such as 
its insistence on women’s diversity, are new” (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 10). The claim here that 
“insistence on women’s diversity” is something “new,” something that belongs to third wave 
feminism, implies that (old) second wave feminist theory did not address the issue of women’s 
diversity, or consider it important, without offering any arguments or citational evidence for thinking 
that this was the case.  
This is not to deny that the frequent characterization of the so-called second wave as 
“universalizing,” “essentialist,” or “racist,” for example, contains many grains of truth. It is 
undoubtedly true that many feminist texts written by white feminists in the 1970s (and before and 
since) have indeed been implicitly and/or explicitly racist, or seemingly oblivious to the differences 
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that racialization makes. 41 White women’s writings and activism, moreover, have received much 
more attention from outside and inside feminist circles, rendering it a white-dominated or “white-
washed” discourse and movement (Roth 2004, 6). Accordingly, the depiction of the second wave as 
“homogenous” or “racist” within third wave narratives is intended as “an acknowledgement of the 
dominance of white feminists, and the secondary status given to black feminists or feminists of color 
during the last forty years of feminist theory and movement” (Henry 2004, 33). 42  
The temporal logic of the gesture, however, often backfires, because when second wave feminism is 
consistently represented as white and middle class, the presence of nonwhite, non-middle class 
women in 1970s feminism remains erased. As Lisa Marie Hogeland writes, “it’s become a truism that 
the second wave was racist . . . no matter that such a blanket argument writes out of our history the 
enormous contributions of women of color in the 1970s” (Hogeland 2001, 110; see also Henry 2004, 
33). A similar effect is produced by narratives that present the work of feminists of color as 
“critiques” of second wave feminism. 43 For example, feminists such as Gloria Anzald úa or Audre 
Lordes are the contemporaries of many white feminists who are associated with the second wave; 
yet their work is consistently positioned as a response to the second wave and thus as inaugurating a 
“new era” of inclusive third wave feminism (Fernandes 2010). Although the intention here is to 
cultivate a more diverse kind of feminism, the organization of the narrative into sequential phases 
means that “the differences represented by . . . women of color only become visible in the last 
phase” (Sandoval 2000, 50). 44 Consequently, as Rita Felski argues, “difference loses much of its 
power by being seen in epochal terms . . . [it] is recognized only in the context of the present and 
subsumed within a familiar story of evolution from sameness to difference, from the one to the 
many” (Felski 2000, 2–3; see also Davis 1995, 282). 
CONCLUSION 
 The aim of this introductory chapter has been to demonstrate why feminism needs alternative 
concepts of historical time, and to begin to situate feminist historiography within the broader 
context of the philosophy of history. To this end, I have considered the influence of speculative 
philosophies of “world history” upon the ways in which feminists have narrated and conceptualized 
the history of feminism. Though it may seem like something of a leap to move from Hegel’s 
nineteenth-century Lectures on the Philosophy of History to twenty-first-century narratives of third 
wave feminism, I have argued that the motifs of graduated progression and teleology that are 
expounded so clearly in Hegel’s lectures can also be found in narratives of feminist “waves” and 
“phases.” As such, the legacy of speculative philosophies of history survives within feminist 
historiography in the form of temporal logics, which have a powerful effect on the way that we 
relate to feminisms of different times and places.  
The question, then, is how we might unsettle and dislodge these temporal logics and the concepts of 
historical time that sustain them. As Wendy Brown observes, “whilst many have lost confidence in a 
historiography bound to a notion of progress . . . we have coined no political substitute for 
progressive understandings of where we have come from and where we are going” (2001, 3). For 
some, the answer is to refuse the idea of historical time altogether, arguing that it is irredeemably 
entangled with ideas of teleological progress and totality (see, e.g., Ermath 1992). This kind of 
antipathy toward the concept of historical time is discernible, for example, within various feminist 
writings on “women’s time,” where historical time is consistently characterized as a patriarchal, 
“phallocentrically structured, forward moving time” (Forman and Sowton 1989, xii; see also Kristeva 
1986c; Showalter 1985a). Undoubtedly, the concept of “women’s time” has opened up many fruitful 
enquiries into women’s temporal perspectives and experiences, which have importantly challenged 
androcentric and patriarchal accounts of time-consciousness and temporal existence. Yet, to 
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position “women’s time” against “historical time” is to overlook the important ways in which the 
idea of historical time has shaped, and continues to shape, women’s lives and feminist politics (Felski 
2000, 3; Watts 1988, 14). 45  
A different strategy is to call for a reconceptualization of historical time, rather than for its 
abandonment. It is certainly true that ideas about historical time have been dominated by 
teleological, totalizing models; however, the concept of historical time is not simply reducible to 
grand notions of teleological progress and totality. It has a much wider reach and range of meanings, 
as well as having value as a “largescale” time that enables the sharing of multiple pasts, presents, 
and futures. This point has been well made by Felski, who argues forcefully against any reductive or 
generalizing claims about the modern understanding and sense of “history” or “historical time,” and 
proposes that neither concept can be easily “banished from our repertoires of useful tools to think 
with” (ibid., 13). Following in this spirit, the rest of the book will take a reconstructive approach that 
seeks to articulate a multidirectional, multilinear model of historical time as a basis for thinking and 
constructing feminist histories differently. 
NOTES  
INTRODUCTION: FEMINISM AND HISTORICAL TIME  
1. The examples of recent feminist work on time and history cited here are: Politics Out of History by 
Wendy Brown (2001); The Nick of Time (2004) and Time Travels (2005) by Elizabeth Grosz; 
“Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures” (2000) and “On Being in Time with Feminism” (2004) by Robyn 
Wiegman; In a Queer Time and Place by Judith Halberstam (2005); and Time Binds: Queer 
Temporalities and Queer Histories by Elizabeth Freeman ( 2010).  
2. My conception of “polytemporality” is primarily inspired by Dipesh Chakrabarty’s conception of 
“heterotemporality” in Provincializing Europe (2000). However, due to the potentially 
heteronormative connotations of this term, particularly within the field of feminist studies, I have 
elected to use “polytemporality” instead.  
3. This typology is predominantly inspired by Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative (most notably the fourth 
chapter in volume three titled “Historical Time”), where he gives focus to all of these times as crucial 
in configuring historical time (1988). Yet, while Ricoeur provides the basic architecture for the 
polytemporal typology deployed in this book, I reject his ultimate conclusion in favor of historico-
temporal totality as a regulative idea (for reasons discussed in chapter 1 ).  
4. Alongside the eclecticism of this list, another aspect that may call for comment is its omissions, 
perhaps most notably the absence of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. With 
most projects, there are several possible routes and interlocutors, and this triumvirate may seem 
like the obvious choice for a study such as this. They have all been extremely influential within 
contemporary feminist theory (see, e.g., Colebrook and Buchanan 2000; Rooney et al. 2005; Taylor 
and Vintges 2004), and each offers promising ways of developing internally complex, nonlinear 
understandings of history and time: for example, via notions of genealogy or archaeology (Foucault 
1979, 1984, 1990, 2002), becoming and the virtual (Deleuze 1990, 1994), or the trace and the 
archive (Derrida 1988a, 1988b, 2006). Yet, while their work is certainly relevant, what I have been 
seeking in this project is a focused, detailed articulation of “historical time” as a specific concept, 
distinct from simply “time,” “temporality,” “history,” or “becoming,” and this is not a preoccupation 
that these three thinkers share. Moreover, each moves in directions that significantly depart from 
the broadly phenomenological framework of lived time that I have found indispensable for framing 
and exploring the particular meanings and reality of historical time. Thus, to consider the lived, 
relational dimensions of historical time, and to try and grasp what historical time actually “is,” I have 
found more germane material in the work of other theorists, perhaps chiefly in Chakrabarty, 
Ricoeur, and Koselleck.  
5. “Western” is a complicated and contentious term. In the context of “Western feminism, it usually 
refers to Anglo-American, Western European, or “Continental” strands of feminism. It is retained in 
this book as a form of shorthand for denoting these strands of feminism, and more generally, 
cultural fields and configurations that position themselves, and are positioned, as inheritors of 
intellectual histories including Greco-Roman philosophy and myth, European Christianity, and 
influential intellectual movements such as the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. It must also be 
understood in relation to political and cultural colonialism from the fifteenth century to the present 
day. For a historical and geographical sketch of the “idea of the West,” see Bonnett (2004). For more 
on “Western feminism” and it’s “others,” see Mohanty’s classic essay “Under Western Eyes”(1991b).  
6. The term “womanism” was coined by Alice Walker, who defines a “womanist” as a “black feminist 
or feminist of color,” and writes that “womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender” (Walker 1983, 
p. xi). Chela Sandoval (2000) uses the term “US third world feminism” to refer to work by US women 
of color that created “a new feminist and internationalist consciousness”: a “deliberate politics 
organized to point out the so-called third world in the first world”. To illustrate, she refers to Cherr íe 
Moraga and Gloria Anzald úa’s collection This Bridge Called My Back (1981) and Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty’s essay “Cartographies of Struggle” (1991a). For a discussion of the terms “third world 
feminism,” “black feminism,” “Mestiza feminism,” see, for example, Heng (1997), Mirza (1997), or 
Gillman (2010). To consider the problem of appropriation of political action by women in the name 
of “feminism” see De Groot on the case of Iran (2010)  
7. For more on “negotiating the status of the ‘we,’” see Lyotard’s essay “Universal History and 
Cultural Difference,” (1989).  
8. For more on the various definitions and classifications of a social, political, or cultural 
“movement,” see Cathcart (1980) or McGee (1980), both of whom argue that a “movement” can be 
defined through its discursive or rhetorical form, as opposed to a more traditional historical 
materialist approach that defines a “movement” as a social phenomenon, that is, an organized series 
of coordinated, collective actions in the public sphere. 
9. At a time when feminism is being appropriated in this way, Butler argues, it is surely “more crucial 
than ever to disengage feminism from its First World presumption and to use the resources of 
feminist theory, and activism, to rethink the meaning of the tie, the bond, the alliance, the relation, 
as they are imagined and lived in the horizon of a counterimperialist egalitarianism” (ibid., 41–2).  
10. For more on critiques of hegemonic representations of feminist history, see these special issues 
of feminist journals: Women: a Cultural Review (ed. Calvini-Lefebvre et al., 2010); Feminist Studies 
(ed. Hewitt and Liu, 2002; ed. Raitt and Phillips, 2008); Australian Feminist Studies (ed. Spongeberg, 
2009); and Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature (ed. Laird 2002).  
11. The term “Enlightenment” or Aufkl ärung became widespread in eighteenth-century Germany 
particularly. It was transferred from German into English in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and became common only in the latter half of the twentieth century (Burns 2000a). For 
elaborations on the meaning of “Enlightenment,” see the collection What is Enlightenment? (ed. 
Schmidt 1996), which presents a variety of perspectives from both the late eighteenth and the 
twentieth centuries, including Kant’s famous essay “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?” In this essay, Kant defines Aufkl ärung as a continuous process leading to 
emancipation from prejudice and superstition, and a capacity for independent thought and 
“mature” judgment, rather than an already enlightened “age” (Kant 1996).  
12. Herder, in his 1774 text Yet Another Philosophy of History, criticizes the idea that one can “group 
into one mass the people and periods which succeed each other eternally like the waves of the sea” 
(Herder 1969, 181). Hamaan, in his 1784 letter to Christian Jacob Kraus, offers a political critique of 
Enlightenment philosophy that argues that the so–called enlightened state simply replaces one 
politically dominant group with another, that is, the “Enlighteners” (1996a). Moreover, in his 1784 
“Metacritique on the Purism of Reason,” Hamaan takes issue with Kant’s universalistic approach to 
philosophy, claiming that Kant imagines he can simply “invent” a “universal philosophical language,” 
whereas in fact, words have meaning only in relation to the time and place where they are 
appropriate (1996b). Because of these challenges to the ideas of progress and universality, Herder 
and Hamaan are often described as “counter-Enlightenment” thinkers, a term popularized by Isaiah 
Berlin (Berlin 1997).  
13. See particularly Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1991), 
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1975), or Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical 
Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1955) for influential and striking examples. 
14. For more on the idea of progress in “Enlightenment” philosophy, see Nisbet’s History of the Idea 
of Progress (1980). The first half of the book surveys the idea of progress within the classical world, 
the early Christians, the Medieval era, and the Renaissance, but his key argument is that the idea of 
progress “triumphs” within western philosophy between 1750 and 1900. Nisbet discusses various 
formulations of “progress” during this period, including the influential writings of Turgot, Edward 
Gibbon, Adam Smith, Condorcet, William Godwin, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Herbert 
Spencer, Saint-Simon, August Comte, Karl Marx, and of course, Kant and Hegel. For more on the 
impact of Hegelian thought upon contemporary philosophy more generally see Butler (1999), or 
Rockmore (2003).  
15. To be clear: we must distinguish between Hegel’s philosophy overall, which covers a huge range 
of philosophical topics and concerns, and Hegel’s philosophy of history. For example, Hegel’s 
accounts of morality and politics, the relationship between freedom and the state, and the 
relationship between particularity and universality have informed feminist philosophy in many 
important ways. For investigations into feminist philosophy’s relationship to Hegelian philosophy 
more widely conceived, see Hutchings (2003), Mills (1996), or Sandford and Stone (1999). It is also 
important to recognize the plethora of Hegelianisms that have emerged within western philosophy 
over the past two centuries, many of which reject or attempt to rework the philosophy of “world 
history” that Hegel presents in his Lectures. Such revisionist readings approach the Lectures 
selectively, or turn to other works of Hegel’s to reconstruct a “weaker” philosophy of history that 
abandons any overarching teleology or final synthesis (see, e.g., Houlgate 2005, Malabou 2005, or 
Nancy 2002).  
16. Hegel explains that the realm of the “spirit,” as opposed to the realm of “nature,” is that realm 
“created by man himself” and “encompasses everything that has concerned mankind down to the 
present day” (Hegel 1975, 44; see also Hegel 1977). “Spirit” is a complex term, but it is best 
understood as the world of intersubjectivity that is self-determining and self-changing. “Subjective 
spirit” refers to individual self-conscious existence and experience, while “objective spirit” refers to 
all that self-conscious existence has produced in terms of culture (including art, religion, and 
philosophy), law, institutions, habits, and the “second nature” of an environment produced though 
human labor (Hutchings 2003, 39–40). In fact, as Hutchings explains, objective and subjective spirit 
may be analytically distinguishable, but they are in fact inseparable and mutually constitutive in an 
ongoing process. Thus for Hegel, self-determination is “the truth of a complex, mediated and self-
reflective whole rather than that of an individual agency” (ibid.). 
17. Hegel writes that in the “Oriental world”—an extremely broad category stretching from Ancient 
Egypt to China—the “Orientals” knew that only one person (the monarch) was free; the Greco-
Roman world knew that some people are free; and in contrast, “our own” knowledge, that is, the 
modern Germanic world of Christian Europe, is that all people are free, in terms of the spiritual 
identity accorded to all individuals, which means all have the capacity for self-determination (Hegel 
1975, 54–5).  
18. This constitutes a significant difference from Kant who theorizes the relation between empirical 
and philosophical history in much more ambiguous terms. Indeed, Kant writes in his “ninth 
proposition” in his “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (Kant 1991) that “it is 
admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to how world 
events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends” (ibid., 51). In light of this 
tension between empirical and philosophical history, he casts the idea of progress as a regulative 
idea, rather than a guaranteed outcome. Nevertheless, elsewhere in the essay, he does tentatively 
make the claim that civil freedom is in fact “gradually increasing,” that enlightenment is “gradually 
arising,” and a universalistic, cosmopolitan “feeling is beginning to stir” (ibid., 50–1). I discuss the 
Kantian approach of postulating historical progress and unity as a regulative idea further in chapter 
1, in relation to its endorsement by Ricoeur in the third volume of Time and Narrative (1988).  
19. Examples of relatively recent speculative approaches to history include the writings of Reinhard 
Niebhur, who proposes a theological defense of the idea that history has meaning and direction. This 
meaning or story may not be exhibited or manifested by the course of historical events as they 
actually occur; indeed, argues Niebhur, empirically observed history does not display an overarching 
significant pattern, and more often than not appears meaningless. For Niebhur, then, meaning is a 
question of faith in providence rather than observation of a pattern: there is a fundamental gap 
between the actual events of history and divine meaning. Other examples of relatively recent 
speculative philosophies of history include the work of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee< who 
claim that the course of history exhibits an overarching pattern, characterizing the process of history 
as “the rise and fall of civilizations.” Toynbee moves from the empirical study of the events 
themselves to the postulation of a general principle of “challenge and response,” presenting his 
speculative system as “a conclusion forced upon him by an empirical survey” (Dray 1964, 62–3).  
20. As Adorno famously declared, after Auschwitz it is impossible to claim that “the real is rational 
and the rational is real” (1973, 206). 
21. For more on postcolonial historiography from South Asian perspectives, see Selected Subaltern 
Studies edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), which contains essays by 
members of the Subaltern Studies group including Guha, Spivak, Gyanenda Pandey, Guatam Bhadra, 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Shahid Amin, Parta Chatterjee, and David Arnold.  
22. Dussel associates the Eurocentric perspective on modernity with theorists including Charles 
Taylor and J ürgen Habermas.  
23. In The Invention of the Americas (1995), Dussel highlights Hegel’s exclusion of Latin America, and 
also Africa, from “world history.” The direction of “world history” in Hegel’s account has a course, 
East to West, with Asia as the “beginning” with Spirit in its immature infancy. But America’s degree 
of civilization in Hegel’s view is so inferior and undeveloped that it is in fact the “land of the future,” 
which only becomes significant to world history when it is discovered by the Europeans: “its culture 
expires the moment the Spirit draws near” (quoted in Dussel 1995, 20–1). Similarly, Africa is deemed 
unworthy of inclusion in the development of world history. Hegel writes: “Africa is in general a 
closed land . . . It is characteristic of the blacks that their consciousness has not yet even arrived at 
the intuition of any objectivity, as for example, of God or the law, in which humanity relates to the 
world and intuits its essence . . . For this reason, we abandon Africa, we will mention it no more. It is 
not part of the historical world; it does not present movement or historical development . . . What 
we understand properly of Africa is something isolated and lacking in history, submerged completely 
in the natural spirit, and mentionable only as the threshold of universal history” (ibid., 22).  
24. Firestone’s historical narrative, presented in The Dialectic of Sex, postulates that “the biological 
division of the sexes for the purpose of reproduction, which lies at the origins of class” is the 
mechanism driving the course of historical development (Firestone 1971, 13). Firestone rewrites 
Engels’ formulation of historical materialism to claim that “the sexual-reproductive organization of 
society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate 
explanation of the whole superstructure of economic, juridical and political institutions as well as of 
the religious, philosophical and other ideas of a given historical period” (ibid., 13–14). For recent 
feminist re-engagements with Firestone, see Further Adventures in the Dialectic of Sex, edited by 
Mandy Merck and Stella Sandford (2010).  
25. I use the term “temporal logics” in the sense that “logic” refers to a means of working out, 
organizing, and ordering thought and phenomena.  
26. “ Les temps des femmes” appears in 1979 in 33/44: cahiers de recherch é de sciences des textes 
et documents, volume 5, 5–19. It was translated as “Women’s Time” in Signs, volume 7(1), in 1981, 
and is reprinted in The Kristeva Reader, edited by Toril Moi, in 1986. I refer here to this latter 
reprinted version of the essay.  
27. I will pay more attention to the temporal/historical aspect of Kristeva’s analysis than the spatial. 
For more on the relationship between history and geography, time and space, see Osborne (1995, 
17–20), or Young (1990).  
28. I describe Kristeva’s “avant-garde” feminism here as a (post)feminism, because while on the one 
hand she presents her avant-garde approach in “Women’s Time” as a continuation of feminist 
thought, the essay also implies that the avant-garde attitude is a departure from the feminist 
project, which she equates with naïve egalitarianism or radical separatism, and the fabrication of a 
universal female subject.  
29. “Hegemony,” in the sense proposed by Antonio Gramsci (1971), refers to the phenomenon 
whereby dominant groups maintain their dominance through “the negotiated construction of a 
political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups” 
(Strinati 1995, 165). The intention behind Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is to try and explain why 
the majority continue to uphold the values of the dominant group and the status quo, even when 
these values reflect the interests and lives of just a small minority. “Hegemony” is therefore an apt 
term to describe the dominant model of feminist history, as feminists consistently subscribe to this 
model, even when we recognize that it corresponds to only a very specific trajectory of feminism.  
30. Alongside Kristeva’s essay, Sandoval cites texts by Alison Jaggar (1983), Gayle Greene and Copp 
élia Kahn (1985), Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (1980), Elaine Showalter (1985b), Cora Kaplan 
(1985), and Lydia Sargent (1981) as examples that have given rise to feminism’s “great hegemonic 
model.”  
31. Hemmings’ research is based upon a range of extracts taken from feminist journal editions from 
the 1990s and 2000s, including: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society; Feminist Review; 
Feminist Theory; Nora: Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies; European Journal of Women’s Studies; 
and Australian Feminist Studies. All of these extracts are in English (including articles that have been 
translated into English), though there is a range in the geographical location of the journals, 
including the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and Western Europe. Hemmings’ 
method for this research was to analyze a series of extracts from these journals, which give 
“common sense glosses” of the development of western feminist theory. She deliberately highlights 
extracts that are tangential to the author’s main argument such as introductions or segue 
paragraphs. She also cites the source of the extracts she analyzes—the journal and the year—rather 
than the individual author, a tactic that is intended to emphasize the role of “journal communities” 
in establishing dominant feminist knowledge practices (2011, 22).  
32. For examples of feminist “new materialism,” see the collection New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics, which includes essays by prominent “new materialist” theorists Jane Bennett, 
Rosi Braidotti, and Elizabeth Grosz (ed. Coole and Frost, 2010).  
33. In her article “Imaginary Prohibitions” (2008), Sara Ahmed makes a similar argument to 
Hemmings. While affirming that there is much useful and insightful work being done under the 
name of feminist “new materialism,” Ahmed calls into question its “founding gesture,” which is to 
point to feminism as being routinely anti-biological, or habitually “social constructionist”: a gesture 
that has been taken for granted and in turn offers a false and reductive history of feminist 
engagements with biology, science, and materialism: “You can only argue for a return to biology by 
forgetting the feminist work on the biological, including the work of feminists trained in the 
biological sciences. In other words, you can only claim that feminism has forgotten the biological if 
you forget this feminist work” (2008, 24–7).  
34. For an example of a forceful proclamation of a second wave of feminism, see Greer’s The Female 
Eunuch (1970), which will be discussed in chapter 3 . For examples of third wave writings see Walker 
(1995), Heywood and Drake (1997), Dicker and Piepmeier (2003), and Baumgardner and Richards 
(2000).  
35. It is significant, for example, that the coining of the term “second wave” is generally traced not 
to an academic text but to a 1968 article written by journalist Martha Weinman Lears for the New 
York Times magazine on the rise of “The Second Feminist Wave” (Hewitt 2010, 1). Similarly, the term 
third wave feminism first gained attention when it was used in an article written for Ms magazine by 
Rebecca Walker, entitled “Becoming the Third Wave” in 1992 (Henry 2004, 23). . Henry points out 
that the term “third wave” was in fact used in the academic journal Feminist Studies five years 
earlier, by Deborah Rosenfelt and Judith Stacey in an article entitled “Second Thoughts on the 
Second Wave.” However, the fact that it is Walker that is generally credited with coining the term 
perhaps corroborates the argument that the term “third wave” feminism is associated with feminist 
activism more generally speaking, rather than with a primarily academic approach.  
36. According to Megill’s taxonomy, a “master narrative” claims to offer the authoritative account of 
a particular segment of history and a “grand narrative” claims to offer the authoritative account of 
history generally, while a “metanarrative” (most commonly belief in God or an immanent rationality) 
is what serves to justify the grand narrative (Megill 1995, 152–3). 
37. To be sure, the triumphant tone is missing in the case of “loss” narratives, given that they are 
laments (Hemmings 2005; 2011). Nevertheless, the logic of teleological totalization is still apparent 
in the loss narratives. That is, the author performs a retrospective totalization of feminist history 
from a position of wisdom and superior knowledge in the present, charting feminism’s supposed 
decline and descent into theoretical impasse. Indeed, as Hemmings observes, many loss narratives 
not only perform totalizing diagnoses of the past and present, but further, orient themselves toward 
future prediction when they suggest that the only hope for the future is a return to feminism’s 
glorious past.  
38. This evolutionary logic is further fuelled by the “inclusion paradigm,” which positions non-
Western women as outside feminism, in need of the “recognition” or “inclusion” of the “third wave’s 
embrace” (Fernandes 2010). The presupposition, as Fernandes argues, is that feminism is a 
phenomenon and product of white western society that is “imported” to the non-Western world 
(ibid.).  
39. To consider the way that historicist logics are deployed within feminist theory, Jennifer Fleissner 
gives a survey of the critical treatment of white American female writers of the 1880s such as Sarah 
Orne Jewett, Edith Wharton, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Kate Chopin, over the past forty years of 
feminist criticism (Fleissner 2002). The first approach Fleissner identifies can be described as 
“affirmative,” as it aims to build affinitive bridges between the past and present, and concentrates 
wholly on appropriating the “good bits” of these texts in line with feminist thought in the present. 
The second can be described as a “historicist” approach that aims at a “critical distance,” “locating” 
the texts within their particular historical moment or context, and interpreting them according to 
the norms and practices of their day. The affirmative approach constructs a continuity between 
(certain aspects of) the 1880s texts and feminist ideas of the present, while the historicist approach 
sets up a break, as the writings are fixed or located in their historical “moment.” In the historicist 
readings, “the authors are made to represent their era’s worst excesses of class snobbery, racism, 
cultural imperialism–all the things that the scholars who uncovered them would wish only to leave 
behind” (Fleissner 2002, 46–7). Yet in fact, Fleissner argues that while the affirmative approach 
posits an affinity between past and present, it still presumes that the present has “transcended” and 
essentially overcome the problems of the past: “looking back, we are able to construct a better 
perspective that keeps the good while rejecting the bad” (ibid., 49).  
40. For compelling depictions of the technique of “othering,” see Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) 
or Genevieve Lloyd’s Man of Reason (1993b). 
41. In an essay “Double Jeopardy” published in 1970, Francis Beale was already describing the 
second wave of US feminism as a “white women’s movement,” because of its insistence on 
organizing around the division of male/female alone, and widespread refusal to grasp the 
significance of racial and class divisions for the theorization of sexual politics (Beale 1970).  
42. This gloss by Kristina Sheryl Wong in Piepmeier and Dicker’s anthology serves as a good example: 
“First and second wave feminisms sought to empower women as a united front. Although they 
offered a political voice for women as a whole, they didn’t acknowledge the varying agendas and 
experiences of individual women. Third wave feminism was a response by women of color and 
others who felt homogenized by a movement defined by the goals of middle-class, white women” 
(Wong 2003, 295).  
43. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for example, introduce their anthology on third wave 
feminism by asserting that “the definitional moment of third wave feminism has been theorized as 
proceeding from critiques of the white women’s movement that were initiated by women of color, 
as well as from the many instances of coalition work undertaken by U.S. third world feminists” 
(Heywood and Drake 1997, 2). 
44. Further, it leads to a frequent typecasting of the work of black feminists as “identity politics,” an 
approach that is usually characterized within feminist theory as an improvement on the 
universalizing tendencies of “1970s feminism,” but which nevertheless remains grounded in rigid 
and static identity categories (Fernandes 2010, 110). While it is often acknowledged that black 
feminism and poststructuralist feminism share a common concern with difference, argues 
Hemmings, the two camps are frequently imagined to be composed of “different writing subjects,” 
and it is ultimately poststructuralism that is credited with the move away from essentialist notions of 
universal womanhood and treated as “contemporary” (Hemmings 2011, 46). Yet in fact, as 
Fernandes argues, much of the work produced by black feminists and feminists of color in the 1980s, 
such as Anzald úa, represents a theoretical challenge to the “logic of identification” that supposedly 
characterizes black feminist “identity politics” (Fernandes 2010, 110). 
45. Problems have also arisen from the way in which “women’s time” has consistently been depicted 
as “cyclical” in opposition to the “phallocentrically structured, forward moving time” of men 
(Forman and Sowton 1989). This dualistic approach has come under critical fire, not only for its 
essentialist overtones (in equating “women’s time” with the time of “nature” or “biology”), but 
further, for its failure to acknowledge the ways that “linear time” is lived by women as well as men. 
Felski draws parallels between the way that the temporality of non-Western societies and cultures is 
portrayed as “cyclical” and closer to nature, in juxtaposition to the “linear” time of the postindustrial 
West (Felski 2000). See also Gupta on this issue (1992). 
